The recent explosion of popular protest in China, often framed as a demand for the fulfillment of "rights," has captured widespread attention. Some observers interpret the protests as signs of a "moral vacuum." Others see the unrest as signaling a powerful new "rights consciousness." In either case, the protests are often regarded as a major challenge to the stability of the political system. In this article, an examination of Chinese conceptions of "rights," as reflected in the ethical discourses of philosophers, political leaders and protesters (and as contrasted with American understandings of rights), provides the basis for questioning prevailing assumptions about the fragility of the Chinese political order. For over two millennia, Chinese political thought, policy, and protest have assigned central priority to the attainment of socioeconomic security. As a result, the meaning of "rights" in Chinese political discourse differs significantly from the Anglo-American tradition.
Viewed in historical context, China's contemporary "rights" protests seem far less politically threatening. The Chinese polity appears neither as vacuous nor as vulnerable as it is sometimes assumed to be.
In recent years, U.S. newspapers and magazines have been filled with dramatic stories about all manner of popular protest in China: tax riots by aggrieved peasants in the agrarian countryside, strikes by disgruntled workers in the industrial rustbelt, petitions by feisty retirees whose pensions fall short of expectations, resistance by irate villagers to the illegal sale of their collective lands, and so forth. Journalists are not the only people writing about this issue. The study of contentious politics in contemporary China has of late become a rapid-growth industry among American social scientists. 1 A distinctly normative tone, inflected with an Anglo-American language of human rights, can be seen in many of the recent writings on this issue. On the one hand, some journalists (and more than a few scholars as well) describe the contemporary protests as symptoms of a pervasive "moral vacuum" in which Chinese supposedly find themselves. Post-Mao China is depicted as a society where Marxism has been discredited, but -absent a Western appreciation of individual natural rights -Chinese have no moral compass to guide their changing and confused lives. as contrasted with American understandings of rights). In examining these normative claims, I
will question both the "moral vacuum" and the "rights-based challenge" perspectives that infuse much of the Western literature on contemporary China. Arguing that an enduring emphasis on collective socioeconomic justice distinguishes mainstream Chinese political thought from an Anglo-American focus on individual rights, I conclude that the contemporary Chinese political order is neither as vacuous nor as vulnerable as sometimes depicted. The government asserts, in other words, that its people have a right to some minimum standard of living ("subsistence" or shengcun) -and, moreover, they have a right to expect an improvement in that standard ("development" or fazhan). The differences between the Chinese and other imperial systems (European as well as Japanese) were significant, but so too were the differences with many modern republican political systems. Mao's ideas were congruent with his own cultural traditions as well. As Schwartz stresses, although a principal source of the Maoist vision was Marxist-Leninist ideology, "this does not preclude the fact that in some of its aspects it coincides with certain traditional Chinese habits of thought and behavior." 29 Indeed, there are more than a few points of commonality between Confucianism and Marxism. The belief that human nature is inherently social, and that conflict between the individual and the larger community is unnatural and unnecessary, is certainly central to both.
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Here I would like to highlight two affinities between Mao and Mencius: the importance of popular -in particular peasant -support in establishing political legitimacy; and, relatedly, the natural propensity of those who are hard-pressed economically to rebel against rapacious officials. 31 Nowhere did Mao express these views more passionately or eloquently than in his famous "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," published in March of 1927 at a time when most of his comrades in the Chinese Communist Party were still focusing on workers in the cities rather than on the rural peasantry. Based upon a 32-day investigation of five counties in his home province of Hunan, Mao described his awakening to the importance of the peasantry. As he wrote:
In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the trammels that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local bullies and evil gentry into their graves. Every revolutionary party and every revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they decide. There are three alternatives. To march at their head and lead them? To trail behind them, gesticulating and criticizing? Or to stand in their way and oppose them? Every Chinese is free to choose, but events will force you to make the choice quickly.
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Here Mao depicts the peasantry as a force of nature -"a mighty storm," "a hurricane"-and argues that revolutionary success hinges upon acknowledging and accepting the natural inclinations of the peasants, rough and violent as they may be.
The peasants are clear-sighted. Who is bad and who is not, who is the worst and who is not quite so vicious, who deserves severe punishment and who deserves to be let off lightly -the peasants keep clear accounts and very seldom has the punishment exceeded the crime . . . A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another. A rural revolution is a revolution by which the peasantry overthrows the power of the feudal landlord class. Without using the greatest force, the peasants cannot possibly overthrow the deep-rooted authority of the landlords which has lasted for thousands of years. The rural areas need a mighty revolutionary upsurge, for it alone can rouse the people in their millions to become a powerful force.
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In Mao's view the revolutionary instincts of the peasantry derive from their poverty. Hence it is the poorest peasants, those with the least to lose, who are naturally the most revolutionary.
Leadership by the poor peasants is absolutely necessary. Without the poor peasants there would be no revolution. To deny their role is to deny the revolution. To attack them is to attack the revolution. They have never been wrong on the general direction of the revolution.
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In these stirring passages, Mao puts forth a view of revolution quite different from that of Marx and Lenin; whereas for Marx the urban proletariat served as the revolutionary vanguard and for
Lenin the Communist Party fulfilled that purpose, Mao is here assigning the role of revolutionary vanguard to the poor peasants who, as he described them "are not afraid of losing anything."
Although Mao's Marxian celebration of class struggle put him at odds with a Confucian preference for social harmony, he nevertheless shared with Mencius a stress on the peasantry as the decisive political force -and a belief that peasant poverty was the root cause of revolution (the modern Chinese term for which, geming, carries the meaning of "to change the mandate").
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After the establishment of a Communist regime in China, when Mao's thoughts turned from revolution to developmental issues, he continued to emphasize the pivotal and dynamic role of the peasantry. In late 1955, Mao wrote of agricultural collectivization much as he had written of rural revolution thirty years before:
A new upsurge in the socialist mass movement is imminent throughout the countryside. But some of our comrades are tottering along like a woman with bound feet and constantly complaining, "you're going too fast" . . . The high tide of socialist transformation in the countryside . . . will soon sweep over the whole country. It is a vast socialist revolutionary movement involving a rural population of more than 500 million and it has extremely great and world-wide significance . . . . The leadership should never lag behind the mass movement, but the present situation is one in which the mass movement is running ahead of the leadership . . .
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Again it was the peasantry, rather than the cadres, who were naturally attuned to the demands of the revolutionary movement. And again it was poverty that generated their revolutionary insight and enthusiasm:
Both the poor peasants and the lower strata of the new and old middle peasants are enthusiastic about the socialist road . . . because the poor peasants are in a difficult economic position and because the lower middle peasants are still not well off, although their economic position is better than before liberation.
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Those who were materially well off, by contrast, failed to appreciate the latent power of the masses. They failed, in other words, to grasp the "Mandate of Heaven."
The well-to-do jeered: "Those ragamuffins think they can set up a cooperative. Never heard of a chicken feather flying up to Heaven." But that is just what this chicken feather has done . . . The poor want to remake their lives. The old system is dying and a new system is being born. Chicken feathers really are flying up to Heaven.
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Here, six years after the founding of a new Communist government, Mao was again identifying peasant poverty as the motor propelling historic transformation -now not political revolution but economic development in the form of agricultural collectivization.
We can certainly question the degree to which collectivization benefited the Chinese peasantry, but regardless of how we evaluate China's actual record of collectivized agriculture, it is worth recalling the political rationale that lay behind it. As Mao presented the situation to his skeptical colleagues, collectivization was being driven by the irrepressible yearning of the poor peasants for a better life. Once again, as had been true twenty years before when he investigated the peasant movement in Hunan, Mao insisted that the peasants were out in front of the Communist party -and party cadres would have to catch up quickly unless they were to be trampled underfoot by a restless populace rushing forward along the road toward socialism. The impoverished peasants, he exclaimed, were performing what had once seemed impossible:
chicken feathers were flying up to Heaven. As in Mencius, cosmic authority (Heaven) was linked to the well-being of the peasantry -and political leaders, if they were to retain their legitimacy, would have to get in step with peasant demands to protect and promote their livelihood. The issues concerning agriculture, rural areas and farmers are fundamental ones bearing on the overall interests of China's modernization drive . . . The development of rural areas . . . will facilitate our efforts to build an economically comfortable society (xiaokang shehui) in the countryside and modernize China's agricultural sector. This is a significant step in terms of the overall modernization of the country. . . To build a new socialist countryside . . . we need to respect . . . the will of the people in rural areas . . . We need to . . . deliver tangible benefits to farmers. . . And we need to use this as a yardstick to measure our progress and performance." "We will focus on rural economic development and make substantial progress in building a new socialist countryside. We need to consolidate, improve and strengthen policies for supporting agriculture and giving favorable treatment to farmers, provide more support for agriculture, rural areas and farmers, and promote restructuring of agriculture and the rural economy." 47 The central leadership is not shy about touting the Maoist bona fides of its "new socialist countryside" campaign. As one government report lauded the benefits of the program:
By the side of the Red Well in Shazhoubei Village in Ruijin City, an old villager named Yang Qingpo could scarcely believe his eyes when he strolled around the newly built cement roads of the village. How could a village where he'd lived for over 60 years change overnight? The old toilets and dilapidated pigpens had been torn down and the garbage that had been piled high around all the houses was gone. Newly built houses were neat and clean . . . 'The new socialist village construction has brought us old folks great benefit. Thanks be to the Communist Party!' He touched the stone tablet next to the Red Well which read, 'When drinking the water, don't forget the one who dug the well. Think often of Chairman Mao.' He felt that it expressed his own deepest sentiments. 48 In practice, the new socialist countryside initiative -which is often coercively implemented -replicates some of the excesses and insensitivities toward the peasantry for which Mao's own campaigns were known. 49 Yet, conceptually, it shares with Maoism an overriding concern for peasant livelihood.
While Western critics express disappointment that China's leaders seem reluctant to devote the same attention to political reform that they lavish upon precise indicators of socioeconomic goals, those who are most affected by these policies -the ordinary Chinese people -may feel years. The factory announced in November 1992 that it was declaring bankruptcy and that its 3,000 workers would have to seek alternative employment on their own. Moreover, retired workers were to be reduced to monthly stipends of only 50 yuan, in contrast to original levels of 150 to 250 yuan. To protest these reversals, a petition movement was launched:
The retired workers who led the demonstration procession knelt down before the armed policemen, pleading tearfully that they only wanted to lodge a petition to be able to receive their original pensions and only hoped for the right of subsistence . . . The retired workers said that the pensions represented the work accumulation that they had made in the past decades and belonged to part of the surplus value they had created . . . Workers on the job said: We just worked according to orders, and business losses were caused by mistakes in the economic plan for guiding production; the blame should not be placed on the workers. The state should be responsible for the future of the workers and should provide them with jobs and training, thus guaranteeing workers' basic right of survival. Represents! We want to eat, and we also want to move toward economic comfort (xiaokang)!"
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The slogans that appear to resonate most strongly with officials, however, are those that avow an age-old claim to a basic livelihood. A newspaper report on a series of labor protests in the northern industrial city of Shenyang gave the following account:
Workers have marched on government offices to protest against their wretched living conditions. . . Soft-hearted officials could not turn away the request for subsidies and wages . . . The mayor of Shenyang declared, "The people are ours. They must at least be able to eat." 59 To be sure, the protests sweeping both urban and rural China today spring from multiple causes and are manifested in many different ways. In the countryside, with the recent abolition of the state agricultural tax, land disputes have replaced tax protests as the primary trigger of collective violence. Even so, the insistent demand for socioeconomic justice -framed as a moral claim to subsistence -is a thread that binds many of these otherwise disparate incidents together.
Although the land disputes concern property rights, they tend to be presented in moral economy terms. In a recent protest against the seizure of collective land in Guangdong's Shunde county, for example, villagers complained to higher-level officials that local cadres "don't care if the peasants are without land and livelihood." 60 In a land dispute near Shenzhen, a protester explained to a foreign journalist, "I have no choice. I have an obligation to fight for our land, along with my fellow villagers. We have to keep fighting until we get our land back. This is the root of our life." 61 In response to the spate of land conflicts, Premier Wen Jiabao declared that "some locales are unlawfully occupying farmers' land and not offering reasonable economic compensation and arrangements for livelihood, and this is sparking mass incidents in the countryside . . . We absolutely cannot commit a historic error over land problems." 62 Wen's speech was followed by a deluge of state-issued pledges for the construction of a new, more just "socialist countryside." The articulation of a well-recognized right to a decent livelihood indicates that, despite the Chinese government's apparent lack of concern for human rights as
Americans may define them, the country is not necessarily suffering from a moral vacuum.
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Despite America's own persistent problems of poverty and homelessness, we do not see many social movements in the contemporary United States focused on a demand for economic justice.
Instead, collective actions generally center on claims of individual civil rights. Take, for example, the numerous -and sometimes violent -confrontations surrounding the question of abortion. "Pro-life" advocates put forth claims on behalf of an unborn child's "natural right" to life, whereas "pro-choice" advocates advance claims on behalf of "reproductive rights" -or a woman's "natural right" to control her own body. Fierce as the conflict is, both sides agree that the proper role of government in this bitter controversy is to protect inalienable individual rights (whether by upholding or by overturning the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision of 1973).
Consider another persistent source of unrest in contemporary America --the extremist militia groups which have mushroomed across the land in recent years. Armed militias claiming
Jeffersonian roots have been linked to a string of terrorist attacks against the U.S. federal government. 64 Insisting that their activities conform to the spirit of the American Revolution, these groups honor an individual's right to bear arms in defense of freedom (enshrined in the Second Amendment) as the central cause and lasting legacy of the Revolution. 65 As a member of the Missouri Fifty-First Militia puts it, "the primary trigger for the Revolution was the same as it is today: you don't mess with a free man's right to keep and bear arms." 66 In the eyes of their militant members, these maverick militias stand as guardians of a natural right to personal liberty against an oppressive federal government. The literature produced by such groups makes frequent reference to an eighteenth-century republican ideology that saw the armed citizen as a people's best protection against despotism. Thomas Jefferson's call to arms is quoted with particular fervor.
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In America, even fundamentally economic protests are framed as a question of civil rights. Take the case of the "California Tax Revolt," whose successful challenge to escalating property taxes (with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978) ignited similar protests across much of the U.S.
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The leader of the movement, Howard Jarvis, justified his activities not with socioeconomic arguments, but in terms of a struggle by rights-bearing citizens against tyranny: "The entire basis of free government in America was being destroyed by virtually unlimited taxation, which can only lead to . . . dictatorship.
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In arguing for a significant difference between mainstream Chinese and American conceptions of rights, and their implications for popular protest, I do not mean to suggest that all (or even any!)
Chinese think only about socioeconomic security, to the exclusion of all other concerns. That would be just as silly as to suggest that Americans care only about political freedom and eschew all material interests. The example of China's Tiananmen Uprising (led by students demanding democracy) or of America's pay equity campaign (led by women demanding equal pay for equal work) is enough to dispel any such misunderstanding. 70 But there is nonetheless, I believe, an important difference in emphasis between our two political cultures --manifested not only in abstract philosophical discourse but in political rhetoric and popular protest as well.
For that reason, I am skeptical of a central theme in much of the recent American social science scholarship on China, suggesting that the popular discourse of "rights" observable in recent protests indicates a newfound claim to citizenship that poses a fundamental challenge to state authority. 71 Such arguments, I believe, overstate both the novelty and the political threat posed by such protests. Kevin O'Brien and Li Lianjiang, in their study of rural protest in contemporary China, note that "the notion of being a citizen is seeping into popular discourse"
and urge that "we should not underestimate the implications of rising rights consciousness and a growing fluency in 'rights talk' in a nation where rights have traditionally been weakly protected" --on grounds that "today's rightful resistance could . . . evolve into a more far- There is no doubt that the terms "rights" (quanli) and "citizen" (gongmin) suffuse both official and popular discourse in contemporary China. But workers who demand that as "citizens" they have a "right" to eat would seem to be following more in the moral economy footsteps of Mencius and Mao than in the liberal tradition of Locke or Jefferson. In a series of newspaper articles that Mao Zedong published in 1922 to promote the idea of a national labor law, Mao (drawing upon the international socialist discourse of his day) identified three "rights"
(quan) that such a law would guarantee: (1) the right to subsistence (shengcun quan); (2) the right to work (laodong quan) ; and (3) the right to the entire proceeds of one's labor (laodong quanshou quan). 79 Surely, then, we should not impute to the discussion surrounding China's latest labor law some new sense of citizenship rights heralding a democratic revolution-frombelow. Indeed, when Sociologist Ching Kwan Lee, impressed by the "constant invocation of law and legal rights in workers' interaction with local officials," suggested to some protest leaders that they were fighting for citizens' legal rights, she was greeted with ridicule: "Workers' thinking is not that advanced!;" "Legal rights? What is legal, where is the law?" 80 The 1995 Labor Law makes clear that its provisions are designed to facilitate state goals: "This Law is hereby formulated in accordance with the Constitution in order to protect the legitimate rights and interests of laborers, readjust the labor relationship, establish and safeguard the labor system to suit the socialist market economy, and promote economic development and social progress." 81 China's pervasive moral economy protests, framed in a language of "rights," have often demanded (sometimes successfully) the removal of unpopular lower-level officials. Rarely, however, have they questioned the ruling authority of either the Communist Party or its ideology.
In this respect, contemporary protesters bear some resemblance to imperial-era rebels. The endemic unrest that punctuated the history of imperial China often led to the replacement of particular officials (and very occasionally even of dynasties), while at the same time retaining and reinforcing certain basic principles of the Confucian order. Writing in the middle of the 19 th century, the English Sinologist Thomas Meadows offered the following explanation for the remarkable longevity of the imperial Chinese system: "In China . . . it is precisely the right to rebel that has been a chief element of a national stability, unparalleled in the world's history."
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While one would be foolhardy to forecast for the current political order anything approaching the lengthy lifespan enjoyed by the imperial system, it does nonetheless appear that today's patterns of protest -still animated by a widespread appreciation of "the right to rebel" 83 -may prove more system-supportive than system-subversive. In an authoritarian polity, where elections do not provide an effective check on the misbehavior of state authorities, protests can help to serve that function -thereby undergirding rather than undermining the political system. 84 Moreover, the current central government's willingness to respond to some of the protesters' key grievances, witnessed most dramatically in the 2006 abolition of the age-old agricultural tax followed by the promulgation of a new property rights law, points more toward political flexibility than toward fragility.
The Chinese state itself actively encourages a conceptual linkage between "livelihood" assume that the invocation of "rights" in contemporary China bears a close affinity to AngloAmerican conceptions of human rights and civil society, which ipso facto imply a liberal critique of overweening state power, we should be alert to the distinctive origins and implications of "rights talk" in other cultural and political contexts.
In a country where rights are seen more as state-authorized channels to enhance national unity and prosperity than as naturally endowed protections against state intrusion, popular demands for the exercise of political rights are perhaps better seen as an affirmation of --rather than an affront to --state power. For this reason, I prefer to characterize the framing of protest in contemporary China as "rules consciousness" rather than "rights consciousness. Please permit us, along with the majority of retired workers across the country, to enjoy the newly designated wage standards. If you ignore this, and refuse to resolve the issue of our legitimate rights and interests . . . at an appropriate time, in accordance with our constitutionally given rights, we will organize a large-scale protest demonstration. We will enlist the assistance of the media in upholding justice. And we may ask relevant government agencies to investigate the insider economic machinations of the Company. This is the democratic and legitimate supervisory authority given to us by the Chinese Communist Party. Of course a confrontation is not our first choice; our first choice is a peaceful livelihood."
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In their various manifestos, the Anyuan retirees stressed that their protest was purely a demand for economic justice, as promised by the state; it therefore posed no threat to political stability.
An activist explained, "We're seeking wages and welfare, not power (quan) or politics. We are asking for permission to stage a demonstration. We may not receive it, but the right to request it is stipulated in the national constitution." 
